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use#LAAGETTING CLOSER OR DRIFTING APART?*
TANYA S. ROSENBLAT AND MARKUS M. MOBIUS
Advances in communication and transportation technologies have the poten-
tial to bring people closer together and create a “global village.” However, they
also allow heterogeneous agents to segregate along special interests, which gives
rise to communities fragmented by type rather than by geography. We show that
lower communication costs should always decrease separation between individual
agents even as group-based separation increases. Each measure of separation is
pertinent for distinct types of social interaction. A group-based measure captures
the diversity of group preferences that can have an impact on the provision of
public goods. While an individual measure correlates with the speed of informa-
tion transmission through the social network that affects, for example, learning
about job opportunities and new technologies. We test the model by looking at
coauthoring between academic economists before and during the rise of the
Internet in the 1990s.
I. INTRODUCTION
Do new communication technologies, on balance, bring us
closer together, or do they push us apart? Observers greeted the
introduction of new transportation technologies such as the rail-
road and the automobile, on the one hand, and the spread of
electronic communication such as the telephone and electronic
mail, on the other hand, with the expectation that they would
help overcome geographic boundaries and therefore draw com-
munities closer together.
1 However, advanced communication
technologies can create new divisions by making heterogeneous
agents more selective. If agents prefer to communicate with
agents of their own type, communities will fragment along types
rather than geographic location. The automobile and the tele-
phone strengthened social interactions based on common inter-
* We would like to thank John Bonin, Yann Bramoulle, Edward Glaeser,
Claudia Goldin, Joyce Jacobsen, Lawrence Katz, Michael Schwarz, two anony-
mous referees, one editor, and seminar participants at Harvard University, the
University of Toronto, and Wesleyan University, and the 2001 North American
Summer Meetings of the Econometric Society for helpful comments. We are
particularly grateful to Glenn Ellison for graciously sharing his data on the
academic publishing process and to Ariel Pakes for detailed comments on our
empirical strategy. Tony Saudek was an excellent research assistant.
1. The telephone census of 1902 discusses the importance of both the tele-
phone and the automobile in overcoming the isolation of rural life [Bureau of the
Census 1902]. Among the futurists who believe that advances in telecommunica-
tion will eventually make space obsolete are Tofﬂer [1980], Negroponte [1995],
and McLuhan [1994] who coined the term global village.
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971ests and along generational lines.
2 Furthermore, the very devel-
opment of the technological underpinnings of the Internet, email-
ing and the World Wide Web, were driven by the desire to
facilitate cooperation between scattered groups of specialized re-
searchers across the globe.
3
We construct a simple theoretical model to explain how de-
creasing communication costs can simultaneously decrease sepa-
ration between agents in one dimension and increase separation
in another dimension. Each type of agents in our model belongs to
some group such as a political party, an ethnic community, or an
academic specialization or subﬁelds. Agents prefer to collaborate
with own-type neighbors, but they face a trade-off between con-
ducting costly collaboration with distant own-type neighbors or
starting less proﬁtable projects with close distinct-type neighbors.
We then study two measures of separation between agents.
Group separation captures the separation between types of
agents by looking at the share of messages that are exchanged
within groups rather than between groups. In our model group
separation always increases as communication becomes less ex-
pensive because agents become selective: the desire to segregate
into type-based groups is the very reason agents communicate
more with distant agents as costs fall. In contrast, individual
separation describes the distance between two randomly chosen
individual agents measured by the time it takes for news to travel
between these agents. A priori, lower communication costs have
an ambiguous effect on individual separation. While the distance
between agents of the same type is always reduced, the increase
in group separation makes it more difﬁcult for news to reach
members of a different group. However, we show that for sufﬁ-
ciently large social networks this latter effect is small and indi-
2. Sproull and Kiesler [1991] describe how the spread of the telephone
strengthened afﬁliation among teenage peer groups. Lynd and Lynd [1929, Chap-
ter XIX, footnote 8] report in their Middletown study the tendency of young people
to mingle with peers in neighboring cities: “The young people go miles away, but
fail to get well acquainted with those near by.” Social life in the town became
increasingly fragmented and centered around shared interests: club groups be-
came prominent and an increasing number of friends were recruited in these
organized environments. Lynd and Lynd interviewed a group of working class and
business class wives. In the ﬁrst group, ten out of 173 friends were recruited in
clubs, compared with two out of 116 friends of their mothers. In the business class
group 26 out of 75 friends were ﬁrst met in clubs, compared with 6 out of 71 friends
of their mothers. A similar trend holds for the husbands.
3. Emailing was a by-product of the ARPANET program which was funded by
the U. S. Department of Defense. The HTML markup language of the World Wide
Web was invented by Tim Berners-Lee at CERN in an effort to make the infor-
mation sharing between particle physicists easier [Hafner and Lyon 1996].
972 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICSvidual separation always decreases. This result holds both for
lattice social networks such as the circle and for small-world
networks that were popularized by Watts and Strogatz [1998].
Small-world networks resemble real-world social networks much
better than lattice graphs and can be easily constructed from
lattice graphs by adding a small number of “shortcuts.” We prove
that if individual separation in the underlying lattice graph de-
creases by a factor a then it decreases in the corresponding
small-world graph by a factor a.
Our concepts of individual and group separation allow us to
decompose the welfare effects of lower communication costs. In-
tuitively, our results on individual separation imply that each
agent who communicates more with distant neighbors exerts a
positive externality on every other agent by speeding up informa-
tion transmission. This allows agents to learn more quickly, for
example, about job opportunities or technological innovations
[Granovetter 1973; Udry and Conley 2002].
4 In contrast, the
welfare effects of increased group separation are ambiguous. On
the one hand, the increase in within-group communication allows
groups to more easily form complementary institutions such as
political organizations (i.e., the civil rights movement, antiglob-
alization protest groups, or environmental campaigns) or new
ﬁeld journals in the case of academic specializations. These insti-
tutions amplify the private beneﬁts of increased communication
with own-type neighbors. At the same time, greater group sepa-
ration gives rise to divergent group preferences because agents
spend more time talking to like-minded neighbors. Increased
preference heterogeneity reduces mutual understanding between
groups and makes coordination across groups more difﬁcult be-
cause of divergent social norms. Taste heterogeneity has been
associated with a decrease in public goods provision and in-
creased conﬂict between groups [Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly
1999]. Interventions that reduce group separation have been
4. Granovetter [1973] was the ﬁrst to emphasize the importance of friends
and relatives as sources of employment information. Montgomery [1991] reviews
the case study evidence on job-ﬁnding methods used by workers which suggests
that approximately 50 percent of all workers currently employed found their jobs
through friends and relatives. Topa [2001] estimates a careful structural model of
the interaction effects in the Chicago labor market. Udry and Conley [2002]
illustrate the role of social networks in the spread of pineapple farming in Ghana.
973 GETTING CLOSER OR DRIFTING APART?shown to align agents’ preferences and promote empathy and
cooperation.
5
We demonstrate the differential impact of decreasing com-
munication costs on group and individual separation empirically
by looking at changes in patterns of coauthoring between aca-
demic economists. We believe that the results are interesting in
their own right and have implications for academic knowledge
production in a more connected world. Our data include all coau-
thored papers in top economic journals between the years 1969
and 1999. This time period covers the rise of the Internet after the
invention of the World Wide Web in 1991. It is a well-documented
fact that coauthoring, in particular coauthoring with distant col-
laborators, increased strongly during this time period. We ﬁnd
that the relative probability of realizing a potential project with a
distant U. S. collaborator increased by 30 percent in the 1990s
compared with the 1980s. We also show that the increased at-
tractiveness of long-distance collaborations made researchers
more selective just as our model predicts: they were 20 percent
less likely to realize a project with a dissimilar collaborator in the
1990s.
The paper most related to our work is van Alstyne and
Brynjolfsson [1997] who introduce the possibility of greater group
separation as communication costs decrease but do not formally
analyze the relationship between group and individual separa-
tion. Another related literature analyzes the impact of lower
communication costs on the relative use of speciﬁc communica-
tion technologies such as face-to-face communication versus elec-
tronic communication [Gasper and Glaeser 1998]. This approach
is complementary to ours: while we assume a single communica-
tion technology but heterogeneous agents, Gasper and Glaeser
look at changes in the relative use of different communication
technologies among homogeneous agents.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
introduces a simple formal model. Section III deﬁnes our two
distinct measures of separation that capture the social distance
between groups of people and between individuals. Section IV
5. Duncan, Boisjoly, Levy, Kremer, and Eccles [2003] show that white stu-
dents with randomly assigned African-American roommates are more likely to
support redistribution to the poor and afﬁrmative action. Gurin, Peng, Lopez, and
Nagda [1999] also ﬁnd a positive correlation between the degree of interaction and
declining racial stereotypes. Experiments in social psychology demonstrate that
cooperative activities between members of distinct groups tend to promote toler-
ance [Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, and Sherif 1961; Aronson 1975].
974 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICSintroduces our main result for lattice graphs which we extend to
small-world networks in Section V. In Section VI we measure
separation of researchers in academia using coauthoring and
conﬁrm the usefulness of our two measures. Section VII
concludes.
II. THE BASIC MODEL
We build a very stylized model of communication with two
different types of agents who exhibit a preference for communi-
cation with their own type. There are 2n agents (n  3) who are
located along a circle (see Figure I). One half of all agents are of
type A, and the other half are of type B. Agents’ types alternate
along the circle: every type A agent has precisely two type B
agents as direct neighbors and vice versa.
We will refer to agent’s four neighbors who are located at
FIGURE I
Society with n  5 Type A and 5 Type B Agents
975 GETTING CLOSER OR DRIFTING APART?most a distance two away from her as her close neighbors and the
remaining four neighbors who are located at most a distance four
away from her as her distant neighbors. Therefore, each agent
has a total of eight neighbors, and all other agents are
nonneighbors.
II.A. Projects and Communication
Time is discrete, and in each time period every agent can
initiate projects with her neighbors. A project can be, for example,
coauthoring a research paper, a lunch or dinner engagement, or
merely a conversation. For simplicity, we assume that the bene-
ﬁts of a project accrue only to the initiator of a project. However,
this assumption can be easily relaxed.
Each agent can start exactly four projects in each time period
and can do at most one project with each of her neighbors. Col-
laborating on a project requires communication between both
agents. We assume that the initiator has to send precisely one
message to his partner. Moreover, communication with a close
neighbor is costless, while sending a message to a distant neigh-
bor has an (additive) cost C.
By choosing a lattice graph, we rely on the Euclidean notion
of distance. Therefore, the types of communication technologies
that best ﬁt our basic model are those for which usage cost
increases steeply with distance. Examples include the automobile
and telephony before the dramatic decrease in long-distance rates
during the second half of the twentieth century.
An alternative notion of “close” and “distant” neighbors la-
bels any agent who is not close to be distant. This notion of
distance better ﬁts communication technologies such as modern
long-distance telephony, the World Wide Web, and emailing with
usage costs depending only weakly or not at all on geographical
distance. We will be able to analyze both types of communication
technologies together when we introduce small-world networks in
Section V.
II.B. Preferences
Collaborating on a project with a distinct type neighbor gives
utility U  while a partnership with an own type gives utility U ˜
which is distributed over [U  ,) with cumulative distribution
function F(U ˜ ). The utility that can be derived from each potential
project is observable by agents before they initiate collaboration.
Because our model is symmetric in both types, we can restrict
976 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICSattention to the decision-making process of a type A agent.
Clearly, a type A agent will always collaborate with her two close
own-type neighbors. The only trade-off she faces is whether to
work on the remaining two projects with her two close type B
neighbors at zero cost, or start a more proﬁtable project with her
two distant own-type neighbors and pay a communication cost C.
A type A agent will pay for costly communication with a
distant type A neighbor if the project has sufﬁciently high
potential:
(1) U ˜  C  U  .
This will be the case with probability (C)  1  F(U   C). Note
that the probability (C) is decreasing in C: new means of com-
munication that decrease the cost C of sending messages make
more projects with distant neighbors proﬁtable.
In each time period our type A agent will make one of three
decisions.
1. With probability (1  (C))
2 communicating with her two
distant type A neighbors is not proﬁtable enough to justify
the higher cost of communication, and she will instead
collaborate only with her four close neighbors. Hence our
type A agent will send half of her messages to own-type
neighbors.
2. With probability 2(C)(1  (C)) exactly one of the two
projects with distant type A neighbors is sufﬁciently
promising to drop collaboration with a close type B neigh-
bor. She will send 75 percent of her messages to own-type
neighbors.
3. With probability (C)
2 collaboration with both distant
type A neighbors is valuable enough to drop projects with
both close type B neighbors. In this case type A agent will
communicate only with own-type neighbors.
In case (2) there is a small indeterminacy because the type A
agent can stop collaborating with either of her two close type B
neighbors in favor of the more proﬁtable project with a distant
own-type neighbor. As a tie-breaking rule we assume that every
agent of type A drops the project with her left (right) type B
neighbor if she wants to work instead with her distant left (right)
type A neighbor.
Note that in our model the total number of projects started by
an agent (and hence the amount of communication she conducts
in each period) is the same for all communication costs C.I na
977 GETTING CLOSER OR DRIFTING APART?richer environment the effect of lower communication costs on the
total volume of communication is ambiguous. On the one hand,
agents substitute away from local projects toward less expensive
long-distance projects (the substitution effect). On the other
hand, the lower overall cost of communicating allows agents to
start more projects (the income effect). The total amount of com-
munication might therefore increase or decrease as a result. We
choose to abstract away from these effects.
We also do not consider endogenous location choice of agents.
If agents could costlessly pick their location before playing the
communication game, we would expect agents of similar types to
move together and maximize utility through local communication
alone. We acknowledge that the desire to live close to similar
agents gives rise to some degree of clustering, and that complete
mixing is an analytically convenient rather than a realistic as-
sumption. However, complete segregation is unlikely because the
choice of location is inﬂuenced by many factors other than the
desire to be close to friends, such as career concerns, choice of
school for children, or idiosyncratic preferences for a certain lo-
cation or apartment to name a few.
III. MEASURES OF SEPARATION
In this section we formally deﬁne group and individual sepa-
ration and discuss the welfare implications of changes in each
measure. Our measures of group and individual separation are
closely related to the indices of “balkanized afﬁliation” and “bal-
kanized communication” introduced by van Alstyne and Bryn-
jolfsson [1996, 1997].
III.A. Group Separation
Assume that agent i sends an expected number xij of mes-
sages to agent j  i in every time period. We can then deﬁne the
degree of group separation 	 between type A and type B as the
share of total messages that are exchanged between agents of the
same type:
(2) 	 

i 
ji Ji,jxij

i 
ji xij
.
The indicator function J(i,j)i sd e ﬁned as
978 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS(3) Ji, j 
1i f i and j are of the same type
0 otherwise.
Since our model is symmetric in types and agents, this group
measure collapses to the share of messages some single agent i
sends to agents of the same type. Larger values of 	 indicate a
greater degree of group separation. Society is completely segre-
gated into noncommunicating communities if 	1. This case is
excluded so long as the cost of communication does not become
zero.
III.B. Individual Separation
Our second measure describes the degree of individual sepa-
ration between two random agents in our society. We deﬁne it
with the following simple model of information diffusion in mind.
Assume that at time t  0 agent 1 has some brilliant idea about
a new technology, and she starts to share it with all of her four
collaborators. We assume that the agent derives no utility from
other agents using the technology and also cannot demand pay-
ment from any other agent for relaying the information.
Note that the share of messages sent to neighbors of her own
type is exactly 	(C), the degree of group separation. At the end of
the ﬁrst period, ﬁve agents will know about the news: herself, two
neighbors to her right, and two neighbors to her left. In the second
period, each of these ﬁve agents will send two more messages to
her right and left neighbors; e.g., agents who already know about
the superior technology will continue to transmit to their neigh-
bors. As long as communication with distant neighbors is at least
somewhat costly, (i.e., 	1) every agent j will hear almost
surely about the new technology.
This will take a random number of time periods T ˜
j. We then
deﬁne the degree of individual separation Sj between agent 1 (the
originator of the idea) and some agent j  1 as the expected time
it takes to communicate the news between those two agents:
(4) Sj  ET ˜
j.
The degree of separation S ˆ is deﬁned as the average expected
waiting time to reach a random agent j:
6
6. Due to the symmetry of our model, the initial agent 1 (including her type)
can be chosen randomly on the network.
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j2
n Sj
n  1 .
Our deﬁnition of individual separation is closely related to
the game called Six Degrees of Separation that was popular on
American campuses in the 1980s. The aim of the game is to ﬁnd
the shortest path of acquaintances that connects two randomly
chosen players.
7 In the context of our model, we can provide a
more realistic measure of individual separation that takes into
account the strength of links along the path.
III.C. Separation Measures and Welfare
In order to understand the welfare effects of changes in the
cost of communication, we decompose the total expected utility
U
Total of an agent in each period as follows:
(6) U
Total 
i1
4
Ui  T  vE  wI
communication externality
.
The ﬁrst term is simply the sum of utilities from the four projects
that the agent conducts with close or distant neighbors in each
period. The next three terms capture the communication exter-
nality that results from the collaboration decisions of all other
agents. It consists of three components: the beneﬁt T of transmit-
ted ideas from other agents, the cost v(E) generated by differ-
ences E in group opinions, and the beneﬁt w(I) of institutions
serving the needs of speciﬁc groups.
We deﬁne the beneﬁt T of transmitted ideas as follows. In
each time period every agent has an idea that can beneﬁt exactly
one other agent in the society. This idea saves that agent a cost c
in each time period. The average loss from waiting for this idea to
reach its recipient is therefore T  S ˆ
c which is equal to the
expected steady state loss. A decrease in individual separation
therefore always improves welfare by giving agents quicker ac-
cess to cost-saving ideas.
8 Speciﬁc examples of ideas are innova-
tive technologies or information about job opportunities: in the
7. The game was originally invented by a group of mathematicians who
deﬁned two agents to be linked if they had a coauthored paper. The aim of the
game was to ﬁnd the shortest path which linked the agent to the famous graph
theorist and mathematician Paul Erdo ¨s.
8. Note, that the total number of messages received by agents in the steady
state in each time period is constant across all communication costs because the
ﬂow of received messages has to equal the ﬂow of produced messages. Changes in
980 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICSlatter case we can interpret T, respectively, as the opportunity
costs of using an inferior technology and being matched to an
inferior job (or no job at all).
In contrast, differences in group tastes and beliefs are af-
fected by group separation. Greater group separation gives rise
to more diverse group preferences making collective decision-
making more difﬁcult. The public ﬁnance literature has identiﬁed
several possible channels. First, group separation can affect the
tastes of the median voter and, more generally, will increase the
median distance from the median voter. Alesina, Baqir, and East-
erly [1999] show how such an increase in the heterogeneity of
preferences can reduce the provision of public goods in a commu-
nity. Second, Alesina and la Ferrara [2000] build a model of group
formation to explain the empirical fact that participation in social
activities and hence social capital is lower in more heterogeneous
communities.
To illustrate the connection between group separation and
group opinions, we present the following simple model. Each
agent has a preference i for the type of public good that is
provided in their community. A type A agent at time t has taste
i
t  A
t  i
t with real support, and a type B agent has taste i
t 
B
t  i
t. It consists of two components: a type dependent compo-
nent A
t (B
t ) and an idiosyncratic component i
t. We assume that
the idiosyncratic component is identically and independently dis-
tributed among agents and has mean 0. The type dependent
component captures the idea that the median preferences of
voters in each group differ a priori. For example, the young might
prefer to spend money on bicycle lanes and playgrounds, while
the old prefer to spend money on public transportation and mak-
ing buildings accessible for the disabled. Another example would
be the preferences of researchers in different subﬁelds for what
type of research to fund: labor economists might prefer funding of
large-scale natural experiments, while industrial economists pre-
fer to collect better industry data. Similarly, astronomers would
like NASA to build bigger and better space telescopes, while
particle physicists prefer to invest in accelerators.
Communication with neighbors affects preferences: we sim-
ply assume that the ﬁnal preference of an agent is a weighted
communication costs only affect the distribution of vintages of ideas. In particular,
decreasing communication costs do not produce “spam” in our model.
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communication shares as the weights on her neighbors’ prefer-
ences. This captures the idea that an agent will be more heavily
inﬂuenced by the preferences of neighbors with whom she com-
municates more frequently. We can calculate the ﬁnal preference
 ˆ i
t of a type A agent as follows:
(7)  ˆ i
t 
1  	A
t  1  	B
t
2   ˜
i
t.
The random variable  ˜
i is a weighted average of the agent’s
idiosyncratic component and those of her neighbors. We can cal-
culate the “average” or median preference for each type by sum-
ming over all individuals of the same type.
9 If society is sufﬁ-
ciently large, the idiosyncratic components cancel out by the law
of large numbers, and we obtain the group preferences EA
t :
(8) EA
t 
1  	A
t  1  	B
t
2 .
Analogously, we obtain an expression for the group preference of
type B agents after they update their initial preferences:
(9) EB
t 
1  	B
t  1  	A
t
2 .
The difference in median group preferences can be calculated as
(10) E
t  EA
t  EB
t  	A
t  B
t .
This formula illustrates how group separation can preserve ini-
tial group-speciﬁc differences. The more separated agents are, the
less they take the opinions of other types into account, which
tends to increase the “median distance” to the median voter.
Differences in the preferences of group members can be fur-
ther ampliﬁed by a phenomenon known as group polarization
documented in the experimental social psychology literature
[Brown 1986]. Agents tend to weigh the views of more strongly
opinionated peers more heavily than those of less opinionated
ones when forming their own preferences. Polarization appears to
be particularly prevalent if communication is computer-mediated
[Hightower and Sayeed 1995], as content on the internet can be
9. This would be the opinion observed by a Gallup poll over a large sample of
individuals.
982 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICSeasily searched for Web sites and newsgroups that support one’s
opinion [Sunstein 2001].
Finally, higher group separation also promotes the formation
of group-speciﬁc institutions I such as political parties in the
political context or specialized ﬁeld journals in academia. These
institutions tend to amplify the private beneﬁts agents derive
from communicating more with own-type agents.
To summarize, lower individual separation promotes wel-
fare, while an increase in individual separation has ambiguous
welfare consequences. On the one hand, higher group differences
decrease welfare, because they make coordination on public good
provision more difﬁcult. On the other hand, group separation
gives rise to institutions complementing private gains.
IV. THE EFFECTS OF LOWER COMMUNICATION COSTS
ON GROUP AND INDIVIDUAL SEPARATION
In this section we analyze how a decrease in the cost of
communication affects group and individual separation,
respectively.
IV.A. Group Separation
A decrease in communication costs will always increase
group separation. Lower communication costs make agents more
selective in their choice of collaborators, and allow them to col-
laborate on more projects with own-type agents. Formally, we can
derive the degree of group separation as follows:
(11) 	C  1⁄2 1  C.
This expression is the weighted sum of the following terms: with
probability (1  (C))
2 half of the messages go to same type
neighbors, with probability 2(C)(1  (C)) three-quarters of
the messages go to same types, and with probability (C)
2 all
messages go to same type neighbors. Note that group separation
	(C) is decreasing in the cost of communication C; i.e., commu-
nication increasingly focuses on own-type neighbors. In particu-
lar, we have 	(C)  1⁄2 for C and limC30 	(C)  1.
IV.B. Individual Separation
The effect of a decrease in the cost of communication from CH
to CL  CH on individual separation is a priori ambiguous.
983 GETTING CLOSER OR DRIFTING APART?Agents will send more messages to distant own-type neighbors
which will tend to increase the speed of within-type diffusion.
This connectivity effect on its own would work to decrease the
degree of individual separation. However, higher within-type
communication increases group separation and makes it harder
for messages to travel between types. In particular, if communi-
cation costs become very small (CL 3 0), news from a type A
agent will almost never reach type B agents. This would make the
degree of individual separation inﬁnite. Therefore, the net effect
of lower communication costs on the degree of individual separa-
tion is ambiguous.
However, for large networks sizes n we can show that the
ﬁrst effect dominates the group separation effect. The intuition is
that connectivity is a global property while group separation is a
local one. As the size of agents’ neighborhoods increases due to
better communication technologies, the number of time periods
necessary for news to travel the distance between two randomly
drawn same-type agents decreases proportionally. Nevertheless,
the expected number of time periods to bridge this distance will
be of order n. In contrast, the waiting time for news to travel
between some agent and her close distinct-type neighbor is
1/F(U   C):
10 news will at some point “cross over” the type
barrier as they spread through the (large) social network. There-
fore, the presence of distinct types does not greatly affect average
individual separation.
The next theorem formalizes this ﬁrst result: while group
separation increases due to lower communication costs, indi-
vidual separation always decreases for sufﬁciently large soci-
eties. We normalize individual separation S ˆ by dividing
through by n to compare separation for different communica-
tion costs.
THEOREM 1. Average individual separation S ˆ (C)i s
lim
n3
S ˆC
n 
1  C
22  5C  C
2 
1
2 aC.
It is increasing in C.
Proof. See Appendix 1.
10. The probability of sending a message to this neighbor is F(U   C).
984 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICSA heuristic proof of Theorem 1 proceeds as follows. Two
random agents live, on average, a distance n/2 apart (since the
circle has length 2n). The cluster of agents who heard about the
news expands on both ends an expected distance of d(C) 
1/a(C)  2(1  (C))  4(C).
11 Hence, it will take on average
(n/2)/d(C) time periods for news to travel between two ran-
domly selected agents.
Theorem 1 has the following immediate corollary.
COROLLARY 1. The relative degree a(CH,CL) of individual separa-
tion in a regime with a high cost CH of communication versus
a regime with a low cost CL  CH of communication satisﬁes
(12) lim
n3
S ˆCH
S ˆCL

aCH
aCL .
Theorem 1 and Corollary 1 can be extended to more general
lattice graphs. In particular, if we look at circular graphs with a
larger radius of interaction, both results will hold but the function
a(C) will change. On two- and more-dimensional graphs we have
to additionally normalize by the degree of individual separation
by n
d, where d is the dimension of the lattice.
Our results differ from van Alstyne and Brynjolfsson [1997]
who focus on group separation and argue that their measures of
group and individual separation comove. However, they derive
this conclusion from simulations on small networks where low-
ering communication costs has an ambiguous effect on individual
separation.
V. SMALL-WORLD NETWORKS
Recently, various researchers have observed that real-world
social networks exhibit small-world features (see, for example,
Watts and Strogatz [1998]). Small-world networks are character-
ized by (a) a high degree of clustering and (b) small characteristic
path length. The coefﬁcient of clustering C(G) of some graph G
measures the degree to which neighboring agents’ individual
neighborhoods overlap, and therefore captures the degree of
11. The outermost agent on the right boundary of a cluster can expand the
cluster by a length 2 or 4. However, if the agent to the direct left of him sent a
message to a distant agent, the cluster expands by a length of 3.
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12 Regular lattice graphs such as
our circle are the prototypes of highly clustered networks.
The characteristic path length L(G) of a graph G measures
the average “length” of the shortest chain connecting two random
agents. The length of a chain is deﬁned as the time it takes to
transmit a message along the chain.
13 The average path length is
closely related to our measure of individual separation.
14 In par-
ticular, as we increase the size n of a circle graph both individual
separation and the average path length increase at rate n.
V.A. A Simple Small-World Network
We adapt a model of small worlds developed by Watts and
Strogatz [1998]: the “skeletal” network of our small world is the
same circular network we introduced in Section II. However, we
allow for additional shortcuts between agents on the circle. Each
type A (type B) agent on the circle has a random link with some
other own-type agent in the network.
15 For simplicity, we assume
that each agent has precisely one of those “weak” links.
We call a shortcut between two agents i and j a weak link
because their individual neighborhoods do not overlap. On the
other hand, agents have strong links to neighbors on the circle
because they share many common neighbors. This distinction
12. Formally, assume that each agent has m neighbors and starts p projects
in each time period (in our model we have m  8 and p  m/2  4). She starts
a project with some neighbor j with probability xij in each time period. Agents i
and j conduct an expected number Yij  min (p  xij,m ˜ ) of projects with the same
set of agents in each time period where m ˜  m  1 is the number of common
neighbors of both agents which can be at most m  1. Then the coefﬁcient of
clustering C(G)i sd e ﬁned as the weighted average of the share of messages
neighboring agents send to the same destinations:
(42) CG 
1
nm  1
i,ji
xij
Yij
p  xij
.
The coefﬁcient of clustering always lies between 0 and 1. It tends to zero for large
random graphs and is 1 for complete graphs (where all agents communicate
equally with each other).
13. Formally, consider the chain of agents C  (A0,A1,...,Am,Am1,...,Am )
that connects agents i and j (i.e., A0  i and Am   j) and denote the volume of
messages that are sent between agents Am and Am1 with xm. The length of the
chain is then deﬁned as LC  ¥m0
m  1 1/xm.
14. However, it is not the same. When constructing our measure S ˆ ,w e
allowed agents to continue sending messages even after they have heard about
news in order to model the spread of news through society. Each agent j can
therefore be reached by agent i through more than one path. Hence agent j will
not always ﬁnd out about the news through the shortest possible path.
15. Our results do not depend on agents having links only to own-type agents.
In fact, they stay unchanged for any kind of type-correlation along weak links.
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[1973, 1995] in his analysis of job search.
As in Granovetter [1973], agents communicate more fre-
quently along weak links than along strong links: in each period
there is a small probability  that the agent can conduct one
additional project. This project can only be conducted either (a)
with one of the two direct neighbors to the right or left which
yields utility U  and involves costless communication; or (b) with
the weak-link neighbor which yields random utility U ˆ distributed
according to the distribution function F over [U  ,).
16 In the latter
case the cost of communication is assumed to be C ˆ . Therefore, the
probability of conducting this additional project with the weak-
link neighbor is
(13) 1  FU   C ˆ   1/AC ˆ .
Note that the function A(C ˆ ) is the inverse probability of conduct-
ing the additional project with the weak-link neighbor and is
hence increasing. While the previously deﬁned function a(C)
captures the rate of expansion of news along strong links, the new
function A(C ˆ ) describes the rate of expansion of news along weak
links.
An improvement in communication and transportation tech-
nology weakly decreases both the short-range communication
cost C and our new long-range communication cost C ˆ . However,
they can improve at different rates: early telephony and automo-
biles decreased short-range communication costs but had little
effect on the long-range cost. Vice versa, modern advances in
electronic communication decreased the long-range cost at a
faster rate than the short-range cost.
Our deﬁnitions for group separation 	
S and individual sepa-
ration S ˆ S carry over to small-world networks with one caveat.
Our deﬁnition of a small-world network does not deﬁne a unique
network but a probability distribution over a class of small net-
works because the identity of the weak-link neighbor is chosen
randomly. With a probability that is exponentially declining in
the network size n, some of these networks look just like lattice
16. Collaboration with distant weak-link neighbors seems contrived. A more
natural extension of the model would have agents choose collaborators among
their three distant own-type neighbors and their two close distinct-type neighbors.
However, the advantage of extending the model as suggested here is that it is
easier to compare the new model with the original setup.
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17 To focus attention on “typical” small-world networks,
we calculate the expected time S
j for news to travel from agent 1
to agent j by taking the expectation over all possible small-world
networks.
V.B. Group and Individual Separation in Small Worlds
Unsurprisingly, the presence of weak links does not
greatly affect group separation. In fact, the degree of group
separation 	
S(C,C ˜ ) of the small-world model is simply a linear
transformation of the degree of group separation 	(C) of the
original model:
(14) 	
SC,C ˜  
	C  1/AC ˜ /4
1  /4 .
Therefore, group separation increases as communication costs
decrease just as it did in the original model.
The effects of weak links on individual separation are dra-
matic. Weak links provide shortcuts through which distant parts
of the circle graph can get “infected” by news. Therefore, the
individual degree of separation no longer increases linearly in the
size n of the circle but only at the rate ln (n) as the next theorem
shows. It is in this sense that weak links make the world “small.”
THEOREM 2. In the small world average individual separation
satisﬁes
lim
n3
S ˆ SC
ln n 
aCAC ˜
2  o.
Proof. See Appendix 2.
In fact, when we compare the relative degree of separation in
the high and low cost regime, we ﬁnd that our insights from the
basic model continue to hold. Interestingly, improvements in
short-range and long-range communication technologies affect
the rate of diffusion in exactly the same way.
COROLLARY 2. The relative degree of individual separation in a
regime with a high cost (CH,C ˜
H) of communication versus a
17. For example, in one realization each agent has a random link to his right
own-type neighbor.
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L)  (CH,C ˜
H) satisﬁes
(15) lim
30
lim
n3
S ˆ SCH,C ˜
H
S ˆ SCL,C ˜
L

aCHAC ˜
H
aCLAC ˜
L
.
Note that in small worlds a doubling of the local rate of diffusion
a(C) decreases the individual degree of separation only by a
factor 2 instead of a factor 2 as in the basic model.
An interesting special case is homogeneous improvements in
communication technologies which increase the rate of short-
range and long-range diffusion (i.e., the parameters a(C) and
A(C) by the same factor f. In this case, the degree of individual
separation will also decrease by the same factor f.
Our small-world results easily generalize to circular graphs
with larger individual neighborhoods. If we consider different
skeletal networks (i.e., a square lattice rather than a circle), our
proofs can be adapted to derive precise results on a case-by-case
basis. However, qualitatively, the results remain the same: lower
communication costs decrease individual separation in both small
worlds and on lattice graphs, but the relative decrease is less
pronounced for small worlds.
VI. COLLABORATION OF ACADEMIC ECONOMISTS BETWEEN 1969 AND 1999
We test our model by looking at the evolution of academic
coauthoring between 1969 and 1999. Several new technologies
decreased the cost of communication substantially starting
around 1980. First, fax technology became ubiquitous in the
1980s: by 1985 already more than 100,000 machines were
shipped annually and by 1990 this number had increased twen-
tyfold [Economides and Himmelberg 1995]. Second, emailing and
ﬁle transfer through FTP was common by the beginning of the
1990s at U. S. universities [Arfman and Roden 1992; Walsh
1997].
18 Third and perhaps most importantly, the rise of the
Internet in the 1990s made it dramatically easier to publish and
search for working papers using the HTML markup language and
browser software. Moreover, deregulation of the U. S. airline and
telephone industries in the 1980s drastically decreased the cost of
traveling and making long distance telephone calls. The calling
18. In the United States 24 percent of physicists and 34 percent of mathe-
maticians had email addresses in 1991 [Walsh 1997].
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between 1984 and 1989 during the price wars that followed the
breakup of AT&T in 1984 [FCC 1999].
The period 1980–1999 therefore provides a natural testing
ground for our theory. We would also expect the effects of decreas-
ing communication costs on group and individual separation to be
particularly strong within the academic community. Research
departments were early adopters of fax machines, and academics
were the ﬁrst users of both email and the Internet because the
original Arpanet was speciﬁcally designed as a research tool.
Our model predicts that decreasing communication costs
should lead to more collaboration between “similar” researchers
but at the same time decrease individual separation of all re-
searchers. Increased group separation can have undesirable wel-
fare consequences: if subﬁelds develop divergent methodologies
such as “natural experimentalists” versus “empirical labor econo-
mists,” it can complicate resource allocation procedures and affect
teaching of the discipline. On the other hand, we would expect
lower individual separation to be unambiguously positive because
it accelerates the transmission of useful and yet unpublished
word-of-mouth information such as the availability of new data
sources or preliminary results of other researchers.
19
We use a data set that contains all articles published be-
tween 1969 and 1999 in eight top economics journals.
20 We mea-
sure collaboration and communication between researchers by
looking at their coauthored publications. Our data set contains
8838 authors of whom 6201 authors published at least one coau-
thored paper.
VI.A. Changes in Group Separation
In order to measure changes in group separation over time,
we ﬁrst have to deﬁne metrics for measuring geographic distance
between coauthors and for measuring the similarity of their types
which can be easily mapped into our model.
We measure the type similarity of coauthors by the ﬁeld
overlap of their publication records prior to publication of their
coauthored article. The distance between coauthors is coded in
19. Such word-of-mouth transmission is particularly important in economics
where publication of new results typically takes two years and more.
20. Glenn Ellison generously shared his data with us. The data have been
collected from the CD version of EconLit.
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coauthor relationships where both coauthors are afﬁliated with
U. S. institutions (U. S./U. S. coauthors) and U. S./foreign collab-
orators. Second, we restrict attention to U. S./U. S. coauthors and
distinguish between coauthors who work less than 200 kilometers
(125 miles) apart and those who live farther apart. Although the
precise cutoff distance is somewhat arbitrary, we had several
reasons to choose 200 kilometers. First of all, it is close to the
median distance between U. S. coauthors. Second, it implies a
total commute time by car of about 4–5 hours for one coauthor to
visit her collaborator. We consider this close to the maximum
distance that would allow regular face-to-face contact between
two collaborators without having to travel for more than one day
or use an airplane.
We test our predictions on group separation by embedding
our model into a simple discrete choice framework. There is a
stream of potential projects yi with characteristics (Di,Si,Xi),
where Di and Si are dummy variables that are set to 1 if both
coauthors are distant and similar, respectively. The vector Xi
captures other attributes of the potential project such as the ﬁeld
of study and other coauthor attributes such as their degree of
specialization and the number of previously published papers.
The probability that a potential project yi will be realized is
(16) prob yi  1Di,Si,Xi  gDDi  SSi  Xi,
where g is an increasing function. With probability 1  g(Di,Si,Xi)
the project will not be realized. We estimate the empirical model
separately for the periods 1980–1989 and 1990–1998 and make the
following predictions.
H1: Improved means of communication decrease the cost of
coauthoring with a distant author such that
(17) D
90  D
80.
H2: The opportunity cost of coauthoring with a distinct type
coauthor increases because it becomes more proﬁtable to
wait for a project with an own-type coauthor. Agents
become more selective which implies that
(18) S
90  S
80.
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We extract all coauthored papers between 1980 and 1999. To
simplify our analysis, we use just the ﬁrst two coauthors of each
paper—more than 80 percent of all coauthored papers during this
period have exactly two coauthors. We only include papers where
at least one coauthor is afﬁliated with a U. S. research institution
and where each coauthor has at least one prior publication during
the preceding ten years.
21 The latter restriction is necessary
because we use an author’s publication record to determine her
type and to measure the degree of type similarity between two
coauthors. The resulting subsample contains 1772 coauthored
articles. Summary statistics are provided in Table I.
We observe only publication dates rather than the dates on
which collaboration between two coauthors started. This intro-
duces a potentially troublesome source of measurement error into
our analysis especially since mean submit-accept times increased
in four out of the ﬁve top economics journals from less than 12
months in the early 1970s to 18–30 months in the 1990s [Ellison
2001]. However, our analysis focuses on comparing decades
rather than particular years. Therefore, any measurement error
will only misclassify articles at the beginning and the end of each
of the two decades.
22
We measure type similarity of coauthors by the degree of
overlap of their publication records. Thus, we do not deﬁne an
author’s type directly but only relative to her coauthor: they are
of more similar type if their publication records overlap to a
greater degree. Formally, for each paper i and author j,w e
construct a vector vij(c) of size 17 which summarizes the share of
publications in ﬁeld c. We then deﬁne our basic type similarity
measure AUSIMIL as follows:
(19) AUSIMIL 
c1
17
min vi1c,vi2c.
This index also takes values between 0 and 1: larger values
21. Econlit provides afﬁliation only after 1988. For 1969–1988 afﬁliations
were manually added to the data set by searching through paper copies of the
eight journals in our sample.
22. Another potential source of measurement error results from a possible
change in afﬁliations from the start of the project until the publication date. Since
we do not have good data on working papers, we are not able to observe whether
the projects were started while coauthors were at the same institution and then
published when they had distinct afﬁliations or the other way around.
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allocated their research time equally across the same ﬁelds. Note
that AUSIMIL always takes the value 0 if both authors work in
distinct ﬁelds. To map the data more closely into our model, we
construct a discrete measure of type similarity. Two authors are
similar (S  1) if AUSIMIL is above its median and dissimilar
(S  0) otherwise.
NATDIFF is an indicator variable which is 1 if one of the
TABLE I
VARIABLE MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS FOR COAUTHORED PAPERS
IN EIGHT ECONOMICS JOURNALS 1980–1998
Variable Mean Std. dev. Variable Mean Std. dev.
MTHEORY 0.197 0.398
Project characteristics IO 0.145 0.352
FINANCE 0.071 0.257
AUSIMIL 0.452 0.317 MACRO 0.188 0.391
DISTANCE 1068.261 1510.552 INTERNAT 0.058 0.234
NATDIFF 0.169 0.375 DEVELOP 0.012 0.111
LONGDIST 0.544 0.498 URBAN 0.009 0.095
YEAR 1989.196 5.123 HISTORY 0.004 0.063
PF 0.07 0.255
LABOR 0.116 0.321
Coauthor characteristics METRICS 0.055 0.228
PRODUC 0.017 0.131
AUPREV1 6.812 7.217 ENVIRON 0.005 0.071
AUPREV2 7.218 9.502 POLITECO 0.011 0.106
AUSPEC1 0.613 0.286 LAWECON 0.008 0.092
AUSPEC2 0.617 0.287 OTHER 0.016 0.127
Fields
EXP 0.015 0.123
N  1772
The data set comprises all coauthored papers in eight economics journals between 1980 and 1998 with
at least one U. S. author: Journal of Political Economy, American Economic Review, Quarterly Journal of
Economics, Econometrica, Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economics and Statistics, Rand Journal of
Economics, and Brookings Papers on Economic Activity. The variable AUSIMIL measures the similarity of
coauthors based on their publication records up to ten years prior to publication of their joint paper.
AUSIMIL50 is an indicator variable and set to 1 if AUSIMIL is greater than its median value. AUSPEC
indicates how specialized authors are. NATDIFF is an indicator variable which is 1 if one of the coauthors
lives outside the United States. DISTANCE is distance between U. S. coauthors locations in kilometers, and
LONGDIST is 1 if the distance exceeds 200 kilometers (125 miles). YEAR indicates the year of publication,
and calendar year 1980 is set to 0. Each paper falls into one of seventeen ﬁeld categories, which are labor,
econometrics, productivity, experimental, micro theory, industrial organization, ﬁnance, macro, interna-
tional, development, history, public ﬁnance, environmental economics, political economy, law and economics,
and other ﬁelds.
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tance between academic institutions of both coauthors in kilome-
ters for U. S./U. S. coauthors. LONGDIST is an indicator vari-
able equal to 1 iff the distance between two U. S.-based coauthors
is more than 200 kilometers.
We collect information about the ten-year prior publication
record of each coauthor j by counting her total number of publi-
cations AUPREVj (j  1,2) and her degree of specialization
AUSPECj. We use a simple Herﬁndahl-type index of specializa-
tion deﬁned as follows:
(20) AUSPECj 
c1
17
vijc
2.
This index of specialization is a real number between 0 and 1 and
takes the value 1 if the author is completely specialized; i.e., all
her publications are in a single ﬁeld.
VI.C. Analysis
The patterns of coauthoring with foreign authors (NATDIFF)
and coauthoring with long-distance U. S. authors (LONGDIST) are
consistent with hypothesis H1. Between 1969 and 1979 and 1980
to 1989 the share of U. S./foreign papers was about 16 percent
and increased to 19 percent thereafter. Among U. S./U. S. coau-
thor relationships long-distance collaborations increased from 43
percent before 1980 to 50 percent between 1980 and 1989 and 55
percent thereafter. These results are consistent with those found
in Gasper and Glaeser [1998].
When we regress both distance measures on a year trend and
sixteen ﬁeld controls an interesting trend emerges: U. S./foreign
coauthoring increased mainly in the 1990s while U. S./U. S.
long-distance coauthoring already accelerated in the 1980s. U. S./
foreign coauthoring increased at an annualized rate of 1.4 percent
in the 1990s after decreasing slightly in the 1980s (see Table II).
In contrast, long-distance collaborations within the United States
increased at an annualized rate of 1.4 percent in the 1980s (see
Table III). This is consistent with the fact that the United States
deregulated their airline and telecommunications markets ear-
lier than most other countries and was also a leader in introduc-
ing electronic means of communication.
In Figure II we decompose the changes in the patterns of coau-
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emerge from “eyeballing” the U. S. data: (1) coauthoring between
distinct-type and close coauthors has declined strongly; while (2)
coauthoring with distant own-type collaborators has increased by
roughly the same amount. These trends also show up in the U. S./
foreign coauthoring data but less strongly so. Both phenomena are
exactly consistent with the predictions of our model: agents become
more selective when communication costs decrease and substitute
TABLE II
TESTING FOR TRENDS IN COAUTHORING BETWEEN U. S. AND FOREIGN ECONOMISTS
BY REGRESSING NATDIFF ON YEAR AND FIELD CONTROLS
Variable (80–98) (80–89) (90–98)
YEAR 0.002 0.008† 0.014*
(0.002) (0.005) (0.006)
Field controls Yes Yes Yes
N 1772 857 792
R
2 0.042 0.045 0.063
Signiﬁcance levels: †: 10 percent; *: 5 percent; **: 1 percent.
The dependent variable is NATDIFF; standard errors are shown in parentheses. The ﬁeld controls
include experimental economics, micro theory, industrial organization, ﬁnance, macro, international, devel-
opment, urban economics, history, public ﬁnance, labor economics, econometrics, productivity, environmental
economics, political economy, and law and economics. The ﬁrst column includes all coauthored papers
published between 1980 and 1998 while the next two columns restrict attention to the 1980s (1980–1989) and
1990s (1990–1998).
TABLE III
TESTING FOR TRENDS IN COAUTHORING BETWEEN NORTH AMERICAN ECONOMISTS
BY REGRESSING LONGDIST ON YEAR AND FIELD CONTROLS
Variable (80–98) (80–89) (90–98)
YEAR 0.009** 0.013† 0.003
(0.003) (0.007) (0.009)
Field controls Yes Yes Yes
N 1415 697 622
R
2 0.015 0.027 0.017
Signiﬁcance levels: †: 10 percent; *: 5 percent; **: 1 percent.
The dependent variable is LONGDIST; standard errors are shown in parentheses. The ﬁeld controls
include experimental economics, micro theory, industrial organization, ﬁnance, macro, international, devel-
opment, urban economics, history, public ﬁnance, labor economics, econometrics, productivity, environmental
economics, political economy, and law and economics. The ﬁrst column includes all coauthored papers
published between 1980 and 1998 while the next two columns restrict attention to the 1980s (1980–1989) and
1990s (1990–1998).
995 GETTING CLOSER OR DRIFTING APART?low-value projects with close but dissimilar coauthors with high-
value projects with distant but similar collaborators.
Ideally, we would like to formally test our joint hypotheses
H1 and H2 by separately estimating the probability pi that a
potential project yi with characteristics (Di,Si,Xi) is implemented
in the 1980s and 1990s. Unfortunately, we lack the data to fully
estimate such a discrete model because we only observe success-
ful projects (yi  1). However, under some additional assump-
tions we can estimate the change in coefﬁcients between the
periods 1980–1989 and 1990–1998.
FIGURE II
Changes in Pattern of Coauthoring with Similar and Distant Authors
between the Periods of 1980–1989 and 1990–1998
The two diagrams on the left illustrate changes in coauthoring between U. S.
coauthors, while the two diagrams on the right show changes in coauthoring
between U. S. and foreign coauthors. In each case the top diagram shows coau-
thoring patterns in the 1980s, and the bottom diagram shows patterns in the
1990s. In each diagram we classify all coauthored papers along two dimensions:
coauthoring with close (D  0) and distant (D  1) authors and coauthoring with
similar (S  1) and dissimilar (S  0) authors.
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discrete choice model:
(21) prob yi  1Di,Si,Xi  expDDi  SSi  Xi.
Note that we can interpret D (and similarly S) as the relative
percentage increase in probability that a potential project will be
realized if both coauthors are distant (or of similar type). Using
Bayes’ rule, we obtain
(22) pyi  1Di,Si,Xi  pDi,Si,Xiyi  1
pyi  1
pDi,Si,Xi .
The additional project characteristics Xi include ﬁeld controls and
dummy variables capturing the degree of specialization of each
coauthor and the experience of each coauthor measured by the
number of articles which he or she has published previously. The
cutoff values for our two specialization dummies (one for each
coauthor) and our two experience dummies are simply the
median values of AUSPEC1, AUSPEC2, AUPREV1, and
AUPREV2. The joint project characteristics (Di,Si,Xi) therefore
divide the data set into discrete cells. To simplify notation, we
will use the subindex i both to denote an individual observation
and a cell with characteristics (Di,Si,Xi).
In order to ferret out the effect of distance on coauthoring, we
can simply compare two cells with the same characteristics ex-
cept distance:
(23)
pyi  1Di  1,Si,Xi
pyi  1Di  0,Si,Xi 
pDi  1,Si,Xiyi  1
pDi  0,Si,Xiyi  1
TermI
pDi  0,Si,Xi
pDi  1,Si,Xi
TermII
.
Using our functional form assumption, the left-hand side of this
equation simpliﬁes to exp(D). Term I on the right-hand side can
be easily estimated from the data. Only Term II presents a
problem because we do not know the distribution of coauthor
characteristics in the universe of potential (as opposed to actual)
projects.
However, if we assume that this distribution did not change
between the periods 1980–1989 and 1990–1998, then we can
obtain a formula for the change in the distance coefﬁcient D
when estimated separately for both periods:
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90  D
80  ln
p
90Di  1,Si,Xiyi  1
p
90Di  0,Si,Xiyi  1
 ln
p
80Di  1,Si,Xiyi  1
p
80Di  0,Si,Xiyi  1.
For each pair of cells with characteristics (Di  1,Si,Xi) and
(Di  0,Si,Xi), we thus get a different estimate  ˆ
Si,Xi with
precision h(Si,Xi).
23 By summing over all cell pairs, we can thus
get an improved estimate of D ˆ and its standard error 
2:
(25) D ˆ 

Si,XihSi,XiD ˆSi,Xi

Si,XihSi,Xi

2 
1

Si,XihSi,Xi
.
We derive an estimator for the change S ˆ in the preference for
coauthoring with a similar author in an exactly analogous way.
The assumption that the distribution of coauthor characteristics
for the universe of potential projects did not change between 1980–
1989 and 1990–1998 is important for the derivation of this estimator.
It implies that the geographic distribution of economists across U. S.
universities according to ﬁelds and degree of specialization has not
changed very much during the last twenty years. We do not have data
to verify this assumption: but to the extent that economics departments
tend to replicate themselves when replacing vacant positions with new
researchers in order to preserve the balance of the various subﬁelds
within the department we believe that the assumption can be justiﬁed.
Table IV reports our estimates for D ˆ and S ˆ using the
data on U. S./foreign coauthoring, and Table V repeats the exer-
cise for U. S./U. S. coauthoring data. In each table we estimate
four different speciﬁcations. In the ﬁrst column we characterize
cells only by the similarity dummy Si and the distance dummy Di
23. For each (Si,Xi) the estimate  ˆ
Si,Xi and precision h(Si,Xi) are calculated
as follows. From the data we can estimate for each p
j(Di,Si,Xi)( j  80,90) the
sample mean p ˆ (Di,Si,Xi)
j and variance (Di,Si,Xi)
2,j . We then obtain
(43)  ˆ
Si,Xi  ln
p ˆDi1,Si,Xi
90
p ˆDi0,Si,Xi
90   ln
p ˆDi1,Si,Xi
80
p ˆDi0,Si,Xi
80 
1
hSi,Xi

Di1,Si,Xi
2,90
p ˆDi1,Si,Xi
90 
2 
Di0,Si,Xi
2,90
p ˆDi0,Si,Xi
90 
2 
Di1,Si,Xi
2,80
p ˆDi1,Si,Xi
80 
2 
Di0,Si,Xi
2,80
p ˆDi0,Si,Xi
80 
2 .
998 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICSwhich gives us four distinct cells. In the second column of both
tables we add controls for 17 ﬁelds giving us 4  17  68 cells. In
the third column we also control for each coauthor’s degree of
TABLE IV
ESTIMATED INCREASE IN PREFERENCE FOR COAUTHORING WITH DISTANT/SIMILAR
FOREIGN COAUTHORS BETWEEN THE PERIODS 1980–1989 AND 1990–1998
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
D
90  D
80 0.091 0.098 0.062 0.029
(0.118) (0.137) (0.159) (0.151)
S
90  S
80 0.176* 0.220* 0.236* 0.237*
(0.075) (0.097) (0.108) (0.107)
Field controls No Yes Yes Yes
AUSPEC controls No No Yes No
AUPREV controls No No No Yes
N  1772
Signiﬁcance levels: †: 10 percent; *: 5 percent; **: 1 percent.
Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Distance is measured by NATDIFF. The ﬁeld controls create
seventeen cells and include experimental economics, micro theory, industrial organization, ﬁnance, macro,
international, development, urban economics, history, public ﬁnance, labor economics, econometrics, produc-
tivity, environmental economics, political economy, and law and economics. The second column adds controls
for coauthor specialization using the median values of AUSPEC1 and AUSPEC2 as cutoffs to distinguish
between nonspecialized and specialized authors. These controls subdivide each ﬁeld cell into four subcells.
The third column adds controls for the number of previously published papers by each coauthor using the
median values of AUPREV1 and AUPREV2 as cutoffs.
TABLE V
ESTIMATED INCREASE IN PREFERENCE FOR COAUTHORING WITH DISTANT/SIMILAR
U. S. COAUTHORS BETWEEN THE PERIODS 1980–1989 AND 1990–1998
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
D
90  D
80 0.276** 0.289** 0.290* 0.294*
(0.091) (0.108) (0.127) (0.123)
S
90  S
80 0.153† 0.189† 0.213† 0.190
(0.093) (0.110) (0.129) (0.126)
Field controls No Yes Yes Yes
AUSPEC controls No No Yes No
AUPREV controls No No No Yes
N  1415
Signiﬁcance levels: †: 10 percent; *: 5 percent; **: 1 percent.
Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Distance is measured by LONGDIST. The ﬁeld controls create
seventeen cells and include experimental economics, micro theory, industrial organization, ﬁnance, macro,
international, development, urban economics, history, public ﬁnance, labor economics, econometrics, produc-
tivity, environmental economics, political economy, and law and economics. The third column adds controls
for coauthor specialization using the median values of AUSPEC1 and AUSPEC2 as cutoffs to distinguish
between nonspecialized and specialized authors. These controls subdivide each ﬁeld cell into four subcells.
The fourth column adds controls for the number of previously published papers by each coauthor using the
median values of AUPREV1 and AUPREV2 as cutoffs.
999 GETTING CLOSER OR DRIFTING APART?specialization giving us 4  68  272 cells, and in the fourth
column we control for each coauthor’s experience. Increasing the
number of controls any further is problematic given our sample
size: while each new control dummy allows us to better control for
project heterogeneity, it also doubles the number of cell pairs and
cuts the observations per cell on average by half. Eventually, an
increasing number of cells contain no observations.
For our U. S./U. S. coauthoring data our estimates of both
D and S are positive and signiﬁcant which conﬁrms hypothe-
ses H1 and H2. The effects are quite large: in the 1990s a poten-
tial project with a distant author is 30 percent more likely to be
realized than in the 1980s. The increased choice set makes re-
searchers about 20 percent less likely to realize a project with a
dissimilar author compared with the 1980s. The estimated coef-
ﬁcients are remarkably stable across all four speciﬁcations.
For U. S./foreign coauthoring we estimate a slightly bigger
increased preference for coauthoring with own-type coauthors
compared with the estimated coefﬁcients for U. S./U. S. data in
Table IV. However, we do not obtain estimates of D which are
signiﬁcantly different from zero. Unfortunately, the share of
U. S./foreign coauthored papers lies around only 17 percent from
1980–1998. This makes it hard to apply our estimation technique
while at the same time controlling for sources of heterogeneity
such as ﬁelds and experience.
VI.D. Changes in Individual Separation
To demonstrate changes in individual separation, we simply
calculate the average number of coauthors who separate two
randomly chosen researchers i and j. We calculate this distance
using 1989 and 1999 as base years and by considering all papers
published during a twenty- or ﬁfteen-year time frame prior to
those base years. We say that two researchers are linked if they
have coauthored a paper during the respective twenty- or ﬁfteen-
year time frame.
We then compare the network distance between two random
researchers in the 1969–1989 network with the same measure in
the 1979–1999 network. We repeat the same exercise with a
comparison based on twenty-year time frames (i.e., 1974–1989
compared with 1984–1999).
One problem with this simple approach is that the resulting
graphs are not always connected (and our measure of individual
separation is hence not well deﬁned): some researchers never
1000 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICScoauthor or coauthor with an exclusive clique of colleagues. For-
tunately, almost all researchers belong to the same giant con-
nected cluster.
24 For example, the coauthoring graph of all econo-
mists who have published at least one paper between 1969 and
1998 consists of a giant component with 3443 distinct authors,
while the next largest component of the graph contains only 15
authors. The same giant component exists within all the sub-
graphs deﬁned for the pre-1989 and pre-1999 networks. To keep
our analysis simple, we ignore the small number of author-nodes
who do not belong to the giant component.
Another complication arises due to the fact that coauthoring
has become increasingly common. Between 1969 and 1989 every
author in the giant cluster coauthored on average C1  2.54
papers. Between 1979 and 1999 that number increased to about
C2  2.73 papers, an increase of about 7.5 percent. In recent
work, Goyal, van der Leijy, and Moraga-Gonzalez [2004] argue
that this effect can explain most of the observed decline in indi-
vidual separation.
We want to abstract away from this increase in the density of
the network when comparing average individual separation. We
achieve this by deleting links in the pre-1999 coauthoring net-
work with probability 1  C1/C2. This “pruning” of links pre-
serves the structure of the network in terms of the share of “close”
and “distant” links and makes the pre-1989 networks comparable
to the pre-1999 networks.
The left two columns of Table VI show the evolution of
average individual separation over time for twenty- and ﬁf-
teen-year time frames. In both cases individual separation
decreases by 7 and 16 percent, respectively, between 1989 and
1999. These declines are ampliﬁed if we restrict attention to
authors with more than two publications (see right two col-
umns in Table VI). Such a restriction excludes many “periph-
eral authors” who have only weak connections to the giant
cluster and tend to drive up the degree of separation.
25 Now
average individual separation decreases by 16 and 18.5 per-
cent, respectively.
24. The presence of a giant connected cluster is typical for real world social
networks. Watts and Strogatz [1998] analyze the network of ﬁlm actors who are
linked if they acted in a ﬁlm together and ﬁnd that about 90 percent of all actors
belong to the giant connected cluster.
25. This might also help to reconcile our results with those of Goyal van der
Leijy, and Moraga-Gonzalez [2004].
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Our model shows how advances in communication technol-
ogy have the potential to simultaneously bring us together and
push us apart. We test this hypothesis by looking at collaboration
patterns between academic economists and ﬁnd support for both
lower average individual separation and greater group separation.
There are a number of possible directions for extending our
empirical analysis. First of all, it would be interesting to see
whether our dual observations of lower individual separation and
greater group separation can be replicated for other data sets.
Second, the link between different measures of separation and
economic outcomes should be explored carefully. This would
mean, for example, to carefully map a process of technological
diffusion through different types of social networks.
APPENDIX 1: PROOF OF THEOREM 1
We start by introducing some notation. We denote the cluster
of agents who “hear about” news sent by some agent i by time t
TABLE VI
AVERAGE INDIVIDUAL SEPARATION OF COAUTHORS IN ECONOMICS JOURNALS
20 years 15 years
20 years
 2 publ.
15 years
 2 publ.
pre-1989 n 1813 1420 889 658
L 2.54 2.52 2.58 2.55
S ˆ 8.57 9.34 7.87 8.37
pre-1999 (unadj.) n 2629 1790 1177 801
L 2.73 2.72 2.88 2.80
S ˆ 8.39 8.03 7.13 6.91
pre-1999 (adj.) n 2435 1664 1067 748
(4.36) (2.95) (2.95) (1.48)
L 2.61 2.59 2.69 2.63
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
S ˆ 7.98 7.82 6.62 6.82
(0.029) (0.024) (0.029) (0.025)
The size of the giant connected cluster is n, and the average number of links of every author in this cluster
is L. The average degree of separation is S ˆ. Each column corresponds to a different time frame—the twenty-year
frame for example compares the period 1969–1988 (pre-1989) with 1979–1998 (pre-1999). The two right columns
only include authors who had more than two publications during the time frame. The adjusted pre-1999 network
is obtained by (a) calculating the average number of links in the pre-1989 network (C1) and the pre-1999 network
(C2); and (b) deleting links in the pre-1999 network randomly with probability 1  (C1/C2). For this table the
values of (C1/C2) were 0.930, 0.924, 0.896, and 0.911 (left to right). This link pruning to obtain the adjusted
network is replicated 50 times for each of the four columns, and we report the average cluster size n, link number
L and degree of separation S ˆ from these simulations. Sample standard errors are shown in parentheses.
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t. We adopt the convention Hi
0  {i}. Since a cluster has
two boundaries on a circular graph, we focus on the expansion of
the right boundary without loss of generality.
The leading agent h 
i
t is the member of the set Hi
t who is the
farthest away from i on the right. We deﬁne the distance between
agents i and h 
i
t as di
t:
(26) di
t  h 
i
t  i.
The expansion of the right boundary of the cluster is deter-
mined by the leading agent and the agent next to him if she has
heard the news already. Therefore, the right boundary can be in
one of two states: in state 01 the agent next to the leading agent
has not heard about the news. In state 11 the agent next to the
leading agent has heard about it too. From state 01 the process
transits to state 11 with probability 1  (C) (if the leading agent
collaborates with his close neighbors only). From state 11 the
process transits to state 01 with probability (1  (C))(C) (if the
leading agent collaborates with his two own-type neighbors and
the agent next to him only collaborates with his close neighbors).
Since the probability ﬂow between both states has to be the same
in steady state we can deduce that the probability that the right
boundary of the cluster is in state 01 converges to /(1  ).
In state 01 the leading agent sends a message with probabil-
ity 1  (C) to her two close neighbors and with probability (C)
to her two own-type neighbors (one close and one distant). We can
therefore describe the evolution of di
t through the following tran-
sition matrix:
(27) prob di
t1di
t;0 1  
1  C if di
t1  di
t  2
C if di
t1  di
t  4
0 otherwise.
In state 11 both the leading agent and the agent next to her can
send messages with probability 1  (C) to their two close
neighbors and with probability (C) to their two own-type neigh-
bors. The boundary of the cluster can therefore expand by either
a distance of 2, 3, or 4. The transition matrix becomes
(28) prob di
t1di
t;1 1  
1  C
2 if di
t1  di
t  2
C1  C if di
t1  di
t  3
C if di
t1  di
t  4
0 otherwise.
1003 GETTING CLOSER OR DRIFTING APART?We can then calculate that the time-averaged spread of news
converges in probability to
(29) d  plim
t3
di
t1  di
t
t  1  C 
1  3C
1  C 
1
aC,
which is decreasing in C.
Two random agents i and j are on average a distance of n/2
apart (since the circle has length 2n). Reaching j or a direct
neighbor of j will therefore take on average n/2d time periods.
Reaching j will then take at most 1/F(U   C) time periods. QED
APPENDIX 2: PROOF OF THEOREM 2
The proof proceeds in two steps.
1. We show that the expected waiting time W for news to
spread to at least a share  of the population of agents
satisﬁes
(30) lim
n3
W
ln n 
1
2/aCAC ˜  o  O
.
2. We show that the average time it takes for news to spread
from the share  of infected agents to the remaining 1 
noninfected agents is bounded above by a constant which
is independent of n.
From these two steps we can deduce
(31) lim
n3
S ˆ S
ln n 
1
2/aCAC ˜  o  O
.
Since we can choose  as small as we desire, we immediately
obtain the result stated in the theorem.
1. Step I
News spreads through two channels: (a) existing clusters of
infected agents expand around their boundaries, and (b) new
clusters form—thanks to weak links. We start by analyzing a
simpliﬁed stochastic process that provides an upper bound for the
diffusion of news and hence a lower bound on the waiting W
until a share  of agents have heard about the news. The simpli-
fying assumptions are
1004 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS1. Each agent within the convex hull of an infected cluster
can start a new cluster with probability /A(C ˜ ) through
his weak link in each period.
2. Clusters evolve without overlap.
Both assumptions speed up diffusion. To derive the rate of diffu-
sion of this simpler process, we introduce some notation. At each
point in time t the process generates a new (stochastic) set of
clusters t. The superset of all these clusters is denoted by 	t 
stt. Each cluster    is said to have a vintage . It grows
over time at a stochastic rate, and we call the size of its convex
hull at time t the span D(,t). We use the convention D(,t)  0
if t  . The number of clusters formed at time t is denoted by
Xt  t, and the total number of agents inside the span on all
clusters which have formed up to time t is Yt. Note that for the
coupled process we have
(32) Yt  
	t
D,t.
The number of infected agents Yt increases over time because
there are new infections and because existing clusters expand:
(33) Yt1  Yt  Xt1  
	t
D,t  1  D,t.
We take expectations on both sides and deﬁne yt  E[Yt], xt 
E[Xt] and zt  E	t. We also know from the proof of Theorem 1
that
(34) lim
t3
E
	t D,t  1  D,t
zt
 2
1
aC.
Therefore, we can simplify equation (33) and obtain
(35) yt1  yt  xt1 
2
aC utzt,
where u(t)  1  A exp(/) for some A, 0. We next note
that
(36) xt1  /AC ˜ yt.
We then get
(37) yt1  yt 

AC ˜ 
yt 
2
aC utzt.
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(38) zt1  zt  xt1  /AC ˜ yt.
We next take ﬁrst differences of equation (37):
(39) yt2  yt1  yt1  yt 

AC ˜ 
yt1 
2
aC ut  1zt1


AC ˜ 
yt 
2
aC utzt	.
We assume that u(t)  1a tﬁrst. We then have a simple differ-
ence equation of the following form:
(40) yt2  2yt1  yt 

AC ˜ 
yt1  yt 
2
aCAC ˜ 
yt.
When we solve the characteristic equation, we get a solution of
the form:
(41) yt  B exp
2
aCAC ˜
t  o.
It can be shown that u(t) is sufﬁciently close to 1 for small enough
 that it does not affect this solution to the difference equation.
From this solution equation (30) follows.
Next, we have to relax the simplifying assumptions we made
for the coupled process.
● Agents can start a new cluster through their weak link only
once. Agents start new clusters at rate  and become un-
available for starting a second cluster. However, we have
just shown that the population of infected agents expands
at a rate proportional to . Hence, we again get a solution
as in equation (41).
● Not every agent inside the convex hull is infected. Whenever
an agent at the boundary communicates with a distant
agent, a “gap” is created which ﬁlls up with probability
F(U   C) in each time period. For each  the ratio (yt)/yt 3
1a s 3 0: an arbitrarily large share of infected agents live in
clusters of vintage  for small . By choosing  large enough,
we can ensure that the share of infected agents inside the
convex hull of these clusters converges to 1. Hence we
again get solution (41).
1006 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS● An agent’s weak link can become infected before the agent
can infect that link herself. At this point we use the fact
that we only model the evolution of the system until a
share  of agents has become infected. That implies that an
agent can infect another agent through her weak link at
least with probability (1  )/A(C ˜ ) which gives us for-
mula (30).
● Clusters can overlap. To deal with this contingency, we
again use the fact that the share of infected agents is at
most . Assume that the yt infected would be randomly
distributed along the circle—in this case the average dis-
tance between them would be at least 1/. But since clus-
ters grow around the boundaries, the average distance
between the boundaries of the zt clusters is also at least
1/. Two neighboring clusters can grow together if their
boundaries are less than eight agents apart. The probabil-
ity for this event is O(). Hence a share O() of nonover-
lapping clusters disappear in each time period which again
gives us formula (30).
2. Step II
For the second step we create a coupled process that governs
the evolution of the system after a share  of agents has become
infected. We bias the evolution of this process against the spread
of the news—therefore the process provides a lower bound on the
true process. Note that after a share  of agents has become
infected a share  (1  O()) of agents can spread news
through their weak links (see step I). We call this set of agents I
and the set of agents they are linked to NI. The following rules
govern the coupled process.
1. Weak links generating from agents outside of the set I
cannot spread news.
2. Each agent only sends news to her direct neighbor to the
right if she collaborates with her and this agent does not
belong to the set NI.
The agents in the set NI are on average a distance 1/ apart and
subdivide the circle into fragments on which the coupled process
develops independently. The expected waiting time to cover each
fragment is bounded above by 1/1/(1/F(U   C)). By the law
of large numbers the average time W it takes for news to reach
all agents on the circle in the coupled process is the same, and
hence ﬁnite. But since the coupled process systematically dis-
1007 GETTING CLOSER OR DRIFTING APART?criminates against the spreading of news the average time for
news to infect all agents is also ﬁnite. QED
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